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Review
Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial
of Slobodan Milosevic
Judith Armatta. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010. 576 pp.

Sabrina P. Ramet*
Judith Armatta, a lawyer and journalist, attended the proceedings of the trial of former
Serbian president Slobodan Milošević over a period of nearly three years. During this
period, the court was in session for 466 days, interrupted by repeated breaks necessitated
by the accused’s increasing health problems. Charged with sixty-six counts of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, Milošević declined to have counsel
appointed, electing instead to defend himself. The court’s willingness to allow Milošević
to do so and to do so on his own terms proved to be a huge mistake, as Armatta stresses.
The fallen Serbian leader’s priority was not to defend himself but rather to portray
himself as a martyr for Serbia, outline an alternative history of events in the postYugoslav region, and demolish, as far as he was able, the testimony of witnesses. But
what is striking is that Milošević’s line of cross-examination repeatedly proved to be
damaging to his case, his own witnesses often proved to be more useful to the
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prosecution that to the defense, and Milošević used up a lot of time with speeches and
with lines of questioning entirely irrelevant to the charges against him. Milošević also did
his best to intimidate witnesses, entering into arguments with them; one witness, Agim
Zeqiri, a farmer, was so shaken after the first day that he refused to continue.
Armatta makes it clear that Milošević had helpers in Belgrade, at least until the
roundup of various people after the assassination of Serbian prime minister Zoran
Djindjić in March 2003. These helpers, she reports, in addition to providing legitimate
assistance to the accused, also provided forged documents to the tribunal and were
presumably behind the preparation of some spliced video footage intended, apparently, to
mislead viewers (40). In finding fault with the handling of the trial, Armatta does not
mince words. Where the tribunal erred was in allowing the accused to abuse the process
for his own purposes, rather than assuring an expeditious process (151–52).
As a record of the testimonies, tracking disclosures and providing a summary of
the case against Slobodan Milošević, Armatta is unrivalled. Nonetheless, it seems
apparent that her manuscript was not sent out for pre-publication review by a specialist in
Yugoslav/post-Yugoslav affairs. This is apparent from her stated belief that the UN arms
embargo could be legitimately sought by some actor other than the head of state or
central government, and that it could continue to be applied to Slovenia, Croatia, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina after those republics were admitted to membership in the United
Nations (membership which included a guarantee of the right to self-defense). It is also
apparent from her confused references to the “Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia”
(map, 4), “the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (23), and finally to “the Soviet
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or SFRY” (353). Obviously, the copy-editor at the press
should have caught the last of these. But, in any event, the SFRY was, in Serbo-Croatian,
the Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija, and the Yugoslavs of old were fond
of emphasizing that their republic was federative or federated (federativna) and not
federal (federalna); the term ‘federativna’ was a verbal sign that the Yugoslav union was
loose and highly decentralized. In spite of these infelicities, Armatta’s book may be
recommended for purchase by university libraries.

